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I. INTRODUCTION
Judge Posner's views about appellate advocacy and judicial de-
cision-making are rich and complex, addressing numerous topics
of interest and importance to lawyers and other judges.' His ar-
ticulation of those views is candid and occasionally surprising, and
I focus in this comment on one aspect of his views which may
strike legal and judicial traditionalists as the most surprising of
all-Judge Posner's assertion, without embarrassment or seeming
reluctance, that he consults factual sources not to be found in the
record from the trial court, nor discussed or argued below, nor ref-
erenced in the briefs of the parties, nor mentioned in oral argu-
ment.2 In engaging in his own factual research, Judge Posner is
not alone. Justice Breyer appears to have been doing so for some
years,3 to the occasional consternation of his Supreme Court col-
* David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia,
and Visiting Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. A much earlier version of this Essay
was presented as the 6 2nd John Randolph Tucker Lecture at the Washington and Lee
School of Law on February 8, 2011, and I am grateful for the comments and questions on
that occasion.
1. Richard A. Posner, Judicial Opinions and Appellate Advocacy in Federal Courts -
One Judge's Views, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 3 (2013).
2. Id. at 11.
3. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2767-79 (2011) (Breyer,
J., dissenting);_ Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
803-19 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
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leagues.4 And the phenomenon of independent research by appel-
late judges has become sufficiently widespread that it is beginning
to generate academic commentary.' But Judge Posner is one of
the first judges to describe and defend the practice,' and he has
done so with typical candor and confidence. His remarks on his
practice of independent appellate factual research and the larger
phenomenon it exemplifies thus provides the ideal occasion to re-
flect on the practice, and on the way in which such research and
its use, by taking appellate adjudication and opinion writing be-
yond the four corners of "the record," tells us much about what
appellate practice has been, is now, and may become in the future.
II. THE TRADITIONAL PICTURE
Back in the day, "the record" rigidly circumscribed the limits of
acceptable sources in arguments before and decisions by appellate
courts. The handbooks from which law students learned the skills
of advocacy stressed the impermissibility of citing non-obvious
facts not found in the record,' whether in briefs or oral argument,
142-43 (1999) (Breyer, J., for the Court); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 619-23, 631-
44 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting). And see also Justice Breyer's more general concerns
about the difficulty of appellate court access to needed factual and scientific information, as
expressed in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147 (1997) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring); Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 82 JUDICATURE 24 (1998);
Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Closing Address at Conference on
DNA and the Criminal Justice System, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University (Nov. 21, 2000).
4. See, e.g., Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. at 2739 n.8 (Scalia, J. for the Court).
5. E.g., A. Christopher Bryant, The Empirical Judiciary, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 467
(2008); Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J.
1263 (2007); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record
Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1 (2011); Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact
Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255 (2012); Frederick Schauer & Virginia. J. Wise, Nonlegal In-
formation and the Delaglization of Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495 (2000); Elizabeth Thorn-
burg, The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits on Independent Research, 28 REV.
LITIG. 131 (2008); see also Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v.
Casey Martin, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 267. Relatedly, see Ellie Margolis, Beyond Brandeis:
Exploring the Uses ofNon-Legal Materials in Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F.L. Rev. 197 (2000).
6. See also Judge Cathy Cochran, Surfing the Web for a "Brandeis Brief: The Internet
and Judicial Use of Legislative Facts, 70 TEX. B.J. 780 (2007).
7. "Use only the facts found in the record or facts of general knowledge, which are
subject to 'judicial notice.'" BOARD OF STUDENT ADVISERS, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL,
INTRODUCTION TO ADVOCACY: RESEARCH, WRITING, AND ARGUMENT 46 (Heather Leal,
Syrena Case, Barbara Fiacco, Joe Gershman, Marc Goldstein, Dana Kirchman & Kim
Stallings eds., 6th ed. 1996). The handbook does go on to say that "[o]ther information, like
the conclusions of relevant sociological studies, can be used even though they are not part
of the record as long as proper authority is cited." Id. The relation between this qualifica-
tion and the main rule is precisely what this Essay is about. But it is interesting that an
earlier version of the same student handbook, although noting the use of sociological data
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and novice moot court advocates were often the targets of stern
"Where do you find that in the record, counselor?" rebukes by their
judges if they dared contravene what was formerly thought of as
among the most fundamental strictures of appellate argument.'
Although American appellate practice has long discouraged de-
partures from the record, the English tradition, now weakening,
was even stricter. Until relatively recently, English judges were
prohibited or discouraged by widely-accepted custom from even
doing their own legal research, being limited in their decisions to
reliance on the cases and other authorities actually cited and ar-
gued by the parties.9 For a judge to depart from the field of
sources raised by the parties, it was thought, would unfairly allow
judges to rely on sources whose interpretation the parties had no
opportunity to dispute. If judges could only use a legal authority
raised by one of the parties to an appeal, the opposing party could
not complain that it had no opportunity to distinguish the authori-
ty, or offer an opposing interpretation of its legal significance.o
The United States departed from this extreme version of appel-
late advocacy as chess match long ago, and for a judge, assisted by
increasingly larger squads of law clerks, to use cases, statutes, or
other legal materials not cited by the parties does not produce
even the slightest raising of eyebrows. The party aggrieved by
such practice, it seems to be thought, has no grounds for com-
plaint, for the careful advocate will already have anticipated any
argument or authority that the judge might locate.
The notion that judges may not do their own legal research has
thus long been relegated to history. When we turn from law to
facts, however, the situation is different. Facts are to be "found"
by trial courts, and the task of appellate courts is to determine
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), uses language that is far less permis-
sive than the language in the 1996 edition. BOARD OF STUDENT ADVISERS, HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL, INTRODUCTION TO ADVOCACY: BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT IN THE AMES
COMPETITION 36 (8th ed. 1965) (describing the use of social and economic data as con-
strained by the rules about "judicial notice of facts"). And see also JOHN T. GAUBATZ, THE
MOOT COURT BOOK: A STUDENT GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 68 (1987), warning that
the use of facts not in the record must be limited to facts about which a court can take
"judicial notice."
8. See FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS 252
(1967) ("[Y]ou depart from the record at your peril.").
9. See ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED
STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 102, 242 (1990).
10. Although written briefs are also a relatively recent addition to English practice, see
id. at 243-44, the absence of time limits in appellate argument meant that opposing counsel
would almost always have the opportunity to respond to any case or statute cited in argu-
ment by his or her opponent.
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whether the trial court has properly applied the law to the facts
found below. For a judge to go outside of the record in the search
for additional facts, or for an advocate to encourage a judge to do
so, has long been a cardinal taboo of American appellate practice.
III. THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGE - BY POSNER AND OTHERS
Against the background of the traditional taboo against inde-
pendent" appellate factual research, Judge Posner observes that
his approach to judging in the hard cases that disproportionately
feature in appellate litigation is to want "to get deep into the
weeds,"12 by which he means doing straightforwardly factual in-
vestigation to matters such as "why the transaction at issue was
configured as it was,"1 or, in "a criminal case, in which the de-
fendant is accused of reckless endangerment by firing a gun into
the air,"l4 or "such things as the height, occupancy, density, and
proximity of surrounding buildings, the time of day or night, and
pedestrian density within the range of the bullet."" He wishes
such matters were in the record, or were provided by the parties in
briefs or argument, but, failing that, he unashamedly says that he
includes in his opinions "facts drawn from Web research conduct-
ed by me or my law clerks."" He acknowledges that this practice
has subjected him to some criticism," but emphasizes that it is a
necessary component of the approach to judging that he here calls
"realist"'" and has in the past described as "pragmatist."'"
11. I use "independent" to stress that the issue is largely focused on judges who do their
own research, largely unaided by references in the trial record, in the briefs of the parties,
and in oral argument, and which typically takes place after argument and thus after it is
feasible under typical procedures for the parties to challenge or otherwise respond to the
products of a judge's research.





17. Id. And see Brim v. State, 779 So. 2d 427, 430 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), in which a
judge opined that it was "inappropriate for the court to evaluate or determine the scientific
acceptability of [DNA testing] principles and procedures by examining extra-record,
nonlegal materials."
18. Posner, supra note 1, at 11; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK
(2008).
19. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003); RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF LEGAL AND MORAL THEORY (1999).
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IV. ON WHAT IS NEW AND WHAT IS NOT
In going outside of the record and outside of the submissions of
the parties to locate the facts necessary to support an opinion,
Judge Posner is by no means breaking entirely new ground.20 The
Supreme Court's use of factual information in Brown v. Board of
Education21 is of course iconic, but the psychological studies refer-
enced and seemingly relied upon by the Court2 2 were both part of
the proceedings below and discussed extensively in the NAACP's
briefs before the Supreme Court,2 3 rather than being the product
of any of the Justices' own excavations. 24  And although the so-
called Brandeis Brief is again part of the widespread understand-
ing of the use by American appellate courts of non-legal social sci-
ence data, it is important to remember that it was, after all, a
brief, produced by a party and open to rebuttal by opposing par-
ties.25
20. See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS (2008).
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. Id. at 494 n.11.
23. Brief for Appellants, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2,4,
10), 1952 WL 47265; Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and for Respondents in No. 10
on Reargument, Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2,4, 10), 1953 WL 48699.
24. Indeed, when John W. Davis, representing the boards of education, made reference
at oral argument and in his briefs in the initial argument to various prominent figures
warning of the dangers of too-quick desegregation of the schools, Thurgood Marshall, repre-
senting the plaintiffs, objected, arguing that factual information should be presented only
at trial, where it could be subject to cross-examination. ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA,1952-55 63
(Leon Friedman ed., 1969). Marshall's exchange with Justice Frankfurter on just this
issue, id., is especially fascinating because the psychological studies in Brown have, mis-
takenly, become the standard examples for the permissibility of original appellate use of
non-legal information.
25. Moreover, Brandeis's brief in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), must be under-
stood in the context of what today goes by the name of "rational basis" review. See United
States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2552 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring); Armour v. City of
Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012). Brandeis's claim in Muller was not that re-
stricting women's working hours to ten hours per day was necessarily correct, but only that
Oregon's decision to do so was at least reasonable. Brandeis asked the Supreme Court to
take judicial notice of the fact that there was "reasonable ground" for Oregon's decision.
Brief for the Defendant in Error, Muller, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107), 1908 WL 27605, at
*10. And thus the brief concluded that "it cannot be said that the Legislature of Oregon
had no reasonable ground for believing that the public health, safety, or welfare did not
require a legal limitation on women's work in manufacturing and mechanical establish-
ments and laundries to ten hours in one day." Id. at *113. Once we understand that the
original Brandeis Brief used extensive quotations from numerous government reports and
other public records only to demonstrate that the challenged legislation was neither irra-
tional nor arbitrary, we can see that the purpose for which Brandeis used non-legal infor-




Once we see both Brown and the Brandeis Brief in contexts
more limited than what they are commonly taken to represent, we
can appreciate that judicial factual inquiry into matters not ar-
gued below, not found in the appellate record or briefs, and not
discussed at oral argument is indeed a relatively new phenome-
non, fostered substantially by the ease of electronic research.2 6
When the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore27 drew on factual
and social science information in articles found in the Omaha
World-Herald and AP Online," when Justice Stevens consulted
works on the history of golf in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,29 and
when Justice Breyer provided extensive social science references
in United States v. Lopez30 and again in Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass'n," all were visibly exemplifying a practice that is
largely, even if not entirely, a product of the new world of electron-
ic access and electronic databases. Indeed, the very fact that
Judge Posner refers to information on "the Web" rather than to
non-legal information more generally shows that the phenomenon
of original judicial research into matters and sources not in the
record is becoming increasingly widespread largely because of the
ease of access by judges.
V. OF LEGISLATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE FACTS
In seeking to minimize the extent to which the research he con-
ducts and defends departs from traditional understandings of the
role of the appellate judge, Judge Posner relies substantially on
the well-known distinction between legislative and adjudicative
facts.32 Facts about the particular controversy -was it the de-
26. See Richard B. Cappali, Bringing Internet Information to Court: Of "Legislative
Facts," 75 TEMPLE L. REV. 99 (2002); Lee F. Peoples, The Citation of Wikipedia in Judicial
Opinions, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2009); Schauer & Wise, supra note 5.
27. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
28. Id. at 103.
29. 532 U.S. 661, 683-85 (2001).
30. 514 U.S. 549, 631-44 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
31. 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2772-79 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
32. The distinction was created, labeled, and theorized by Kenneth Culp Davis. See
KENNETH C. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.03 (1958); Kenneth Culp Davis,
Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed Research Service for the
Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1986); Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems
of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942). This distinction
has now become the conventional wisdom. See, e.g., Dean Alfange, Jr., The Relevance of
Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 637 (1966); Peggy C. Davis,
'There is a Book Out. . .': An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1539 (1987); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of
Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987); Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial
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fendant who was seen in the vicinity of the bank ten minutes be-
fore the robbery?; was the plaintiff wearing a seat belt?; what was
the distance between a group of protesters and the funeral they
were protesting?; did the defendants in an antitrust case discuss
prices when they met on such-and-such a day-have traditionally
been understood to be beyond the range of permissible appellate
independent research. These are the facts whose determination is
for the trial court, whether by judge or jury, and are not to be de-
termined or re-determined on appeal. For an appellate judge to go
beyond the record and the findings below in order to investigate
specific facts about the specific controversy, while not unheard
of,3 3 is widely understood to be an unacceptable breach of appel-
late court responsibility.34
Judge Posner purports to accept this limitation on appellate
power, and thus relies on the venerable acceptability of appellate
inquiry into legislative facts-facts not about the specific events in
the litigation, but about the general and not case-specific facts
that are relevant in the law-interpreting and law-making func-
tions of appellate courts. When the Supreme Court in New York
Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111 (1988). For a recent, comprehensive,
and critical analysis, see FAIGMAN, supra note 20. See also Bryant, supra note 5 (reviewing
FAIGMAN, supra note 20).
33. Perhaps the most prominent example and thus the most prominent exception to the
general practice is Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District, 551 U.S. 701, 807-76 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). In
seeking to explain the "historical and factual context," id. at 804, of the very cases before
the Court, Justice Breyer and his clerks engaged in extensive research about the history of
school desegregation efforts in Louisville and Seattle. This research raises a host of ques-
tions. One is whether institutional public law litigation is sufficiently different from other
litigation that Justice Breyer's researches in Parents Involved are distinguishable from an
appellate judge who Googles the defendant in a criminal appeal in order to understand the
historical and factual context of the defendant's behavior. See David H. Tennant & Laurie
M. Seal, Judicial Ethics and the Internet: May Judges Search the Internet in Evaluating
and Deciding a Case, 16 PROF. LAW. 2 (2005). Another is whether there is a difference
between appellate research, even about the particular case, that relies on public sources, as
contrasted with, for example, a hypothetical appellate judge who asked his or her law
clerks to interview one of the parties or take pictures of a crime scene. And a third, which
shall be discussed presently, is whether factual research about the history and context of a
specific controversy is still different from factual research about what happened on the
exact occasion that generated the litigation.
34. On the possibility that the now-routine obligation of independent factual review in
constitutional cases, see Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), is in some tension with the traditional aversion to
appellate adjudicative fact-finding, see Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985).




Times Co. v. Sullivan3 6 made factual assumptions about press be-
havior under two different rules of liability in defamation cases,
for example, the Court made a determination of legislative fact,
just as Judge Cardozo did in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Compa-
ny" in concluding that automobiles were inherently dangerous.
Although the Internet, and, before that, NEXIS and other various
on-line databases," have made independent judicial research vast-
ly more prevalent than in the past," the basic idea of judges rely-
ing on non-legal information to support their law-interpreting and
law-making activities is nothing new. Sometimes, as in Sullivan,
the result is bare assertion, even if, as in that case, the bare asser-
tion might possibly be mistaken.4 0 And sometimes there is an ac-
tual reference to some external source." But the phenomenon of
reliance on external information to establish legislative facts has
long been part of the appellate landscape. In this respect, there-
fore, Judge Posner's initially startling (to some) admission of going
outside of the record to determine legislative facts necessary for
legal interpretation and application may be rather more conven-
tional than some of his (unnamed) critics suspect.
But although independent judicial research at the appellate lev-
el in order to provide the empirical support for law-making or
rule-making is both well-accepted and the paradigmatic example
of legislative facts,4 2 Judge Posner appears to go beyond this un-
derstanding of legislative facts, especially when he explains that
he often needs to do his own research in order to understand the
nature of some particular complex transaction or other occur-
36. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
37. 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
38. See Schauer & Wise, supra note 5.
39. See Larsen, supra note 5, at 1260 (documenting the increase).
40. The Supreme Court's assumption that increased risk of liability would produce
decreased aggressive press reporting and commentary assumes, possibly incorrectly, the
non-existence of strong professional norms among journalists, or the non-existence of
strong consumer preferences for such content in a competitive press environment, either or
both of which might lead publishers to absorb the costs of defamation liability rather than
modify the content of their publications. See Frederick Schauer, On the Relationship Be-
tween Press Law and Press Content, in FREEING THE PRESSES: THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN
ACTION 51 (Timothy Cook ed., 2005); Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (1992).
41. As in, for example, the extensive use by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 445-56 (1966), of published information about police practices, and in Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992), of studies supporting the susceptibility of adoles-
cents to peer pressure.
42. See Michael Saks, Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works, 75 IOWA L. REV.
1011, 1015 (1990); see also Robert Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding
Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1988).
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rence.4 3 This research, however, does not fall easily on one side or
another of the traditional divide between legislative and adjudica-
tive facts. It is true that appellate courts remain loath to re-
examine adjudicative facts as found by a trial court, and that ap-
pellate judges are equally loath to do research into this kind of
facts.' An appellate court that upheld a trial judge's upward de-
parture from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on the basis of its
own factual research into the defendant's seedy past, for example,
would properly be criticized, as would an appellate court that
overturned a lower court determination of medical malpractice on
the basis of its own research into the defendant physician's high
standing on a "Rate Your Doctor" website." And at the opposite
pole, appellate court research into the general social facts it needs
to make a new rule of law seems well on the legislative side, which
is why the causal relationship between a libel rule and press prac-
tices that the Supreme Court created in Sullivan seemed so ap-
propriate.
In saying that he does general research in order to understand
the facts of a specific case, however, Judge Posner seemingly iden-
tifies a new category of fact that is neither purely legislative nor
purely adjudicative. In some sense it seems closest to Monahan
and Walker's idea of social framework evidence, in which aggre-
gate conclusions from social science research are used to suggest
conclusions in particular cases." But Monahan and Walker focus
on trials, and do not address the question whether appellate
courts should consider such evidence anew, nor therefore the
question of what procedures appellate courts might employ in lo-
cating and using such evidence. Posner's discussion of his use of
such information does appear less case-specific than even Justice
Breyer's research in Parents Involved,47 but it is more case-specific
than the use of general information for the purpose of crafting
generally applicable legal rules. And thus although the distinc-
tion between legislative and adjudicative facts is valuable in many
43. See Posner, supra note 1, at 11-12.
44. See generally Tennant & Seal, supra note 33.
45. On the impermissibility of such case-specific extra-record research, see American
Prairie Construction Co. v. Hoich, 560 F.3d 780, 796-98 (8th Cir. 2009), which invalidated
the trial court's post-trial research into the status of an accountant. See also Thornburg,
supra note 5.
46. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 488-95 (1986); Walker & Mo-
nahan, supra note 32, at 569.
47. See note 33, supra.
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contexts, it may help us less than Judge Posner believes in justify-
ing the practice of independent appellate factual research done for
the purpose of helping an appellate judge understand (and there-
fore reach a conclusion about) a particular transaction or a partic-
ular set of facts.
Yet although Judge Posner is arguably relying on a category of
facts and factual research different from the paradigmatic use of
legislative facts, the same concerns might apply to both. Some of
these facts might well be contestable, and thus there emerges
what might be called the due process worry, in a somewhat loose
and non-technical sense of "due process." This is the fear that
judges who engage in post-argument independent research may be
denying to those parties against whom the conclusions from that
research are used the opportunity to present opposing facts or op-
posing interpretations, or just to argue that the research on which
the judges relied is in some way unsound." But there is a re-
sponse to this fear as well, and thus Judge Posner, along with
many predecessors, argues that appellate judges may rely on the
concept of judicial notice in doing their own research and in using
the products of that research to support their conclusions.
VI. THE USES AND LIMITATIONS OF JUDICIAL NOTICE
Judge Posner follows a longstanding tradition in endorsing the
use of judicial notice at the appellate as well as at the trial level."
More specifically, he and many before him rely on the principles of
judicial notice to justify the use of unlitigated and unargued facts
as part of appellate decision-making and appellate opinion-
writing. A closer look at the principles of judicial notice, however,
show those principles to have more limited application than Pos-
ner and others suggest.
The basic idea of judicial notice, an idea existing within the law
of evidence and focused primarily on trials, is that it would be
cumbersome, time-wasting, and simply stupid to require every
fact necessary to a judgment to be presented through formal evi-
dentiary procedures. If a law prohibits shooting birds within the
boundaries of some park, and if it is established that the defend-
48. Cf Singh v. Mukasey, 533 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 (2008) (concluding that due process
required an opportunity to rebut facts found in immigration hearing).
49. Although somewhat focused on Canada, a particularly thorough analysis is Eliza-
beth F. Judge, Curious Judge: Judicial Notice of Facts, Independent Judicial Research, and
the Impact of the Internet, 2012 ANN. REV. CIVIL LITIG. 325.
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ant shot a duck within those boundaries, we do not require the
prosecutor to prove that a duck is a bird. The judge can take judi-
cial notice of that fact, and the fact so noticed is as valid a compo-
nent of a verdict as a fact found by the jury. Similarly, if it is pro-
hibited to sell goods of a certain kind on Sundays, and if an uncon-
tested receipt shows that a sale of the relevant good took place on
July 8, 2012, the judge can take judicial notice of the fact that July
8, 2012, fell on a Sunday.
Under longstanding doctrine,so judicial notice is permissible in
two different circumstances. One is when a fact is genuinely
common knowledge."' Ducks being birds is such a fact, as is
France being in Europe, a Rolls-Royce being worth more than one
hundred dollars,52 the world being round and not flat," banks (at
least in 1995) sending monthly statements to their customers,5 4
and Florida having a substantial tourist industry." In all of these
cases, the judicially noticed fact is both widely known and incon-
trovertible, making proof of it pointless and time-wasting.
There are other facts that are not widely known but which are
so definitively ascertainable that the same considerations apply."
The classic example is the day of the week on which a date oc-
curs,5 7 and there are many other facts not widely known but still
ascertainable to a virtual certainty. Few of us know the value of
pi to twenty digits, but it is easy enough to look up, and there is no
real dispute about the correctness of the answer that could be
found in any number of standard sources. And thus here too judi-
cial notice is appropriate, inasmuch as requiring a party to estab-
lish something like this through the formal methods of proof
would place pointless burdens on an already over-burdened court
system.
Although judicial notice is associated primarily with the trial
process, appellate courts take judicial notice as well, and have
50. See FED. R. EVID. 201.
51. FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(1).
52. See E.F. Roberts, Judicial Notice: An Essay Concerning Human Misunderstanding,
61 WAsH. L. REV. 1435, 1439 (1986).
53. See 21B CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT, KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., VICTOR JAMES GOLD
& MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §5102.2 (2d ed.
2010).
54. Kaggen v. I.R.S., 71 F.3d 1018, 1020 (2d Cir. 1995).
55. State v. City of Miami Beach, 234 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. 1970).
56. FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2).
57. See, e.g., Shenandoah Life Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 242 F. Supp. 680, 682 (D. Md. 1965).
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done so for generations." But as soon as we move from trial to
appeal, important procedural differences surface. At trial, judges
typically take judicial notice of some fact upon request of a party,
and give the opposing party a chance to object, typically on the
ground that what one party may think of as beyond question may
appear otherwise to an opponent."
In the appellate process, however, such procedural safeguards
are typically absent. Although an appellate judge at oral argu-
ment might ask counsel whether judicial notice of some fact is ap-
propriate, and thus give a party an opportunity to object, far more
commonly appellate judicial notice is rarely identified as such, and
takes place after briefing and after oral argument. If a judge writ-
ing an opinion wants to take judicial notice of some fact, she simp-
ly does it, with neither notice to an opposing party nor the oppor-
tunity for that party to object.
In the context of the paradigmatic examples of judicial notice,
this would not be much of a problem. The time consumed by giv-
ing opposing counsel the opportunity to be heard on the question
whether July 8, 2012, fell on a Sunday would overwhelm the slight
possibility that for facts of this type the judge had made a simple
and correctible error. For the standard uses of judicial notice, dis-
torting the appellate process to accommodate to the miniscule pos-
sibility of judicial blunder seems hardly worth the effort.
The problem, of course, is that the same could be said about ju-
dicial notice at trial. The seemingly cumbersome procedures of,
for example, Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence would
again hardly seem worth the effort if the worry were about
straightforward mistakes with respect to the kind of straightfor-
ward facts towards which the entire doctrine of judicial notice is
targeted. But Rule 201 and its compatriots exist precisely because
what at times seems self-evident to one person will be debatable to
another. This is not a post-modern claim about the inevitable con-
testability of fact. Rather, it is the observation that a common
human characteristic is to see one's own truths as beyond ques-
tion. And although it really is true that July 8, 2012, fell on a
Sunday, and that Florida has a substantial tourist industry, other
seemingly self-evident facts are often more open to question.
58. See Dorothy F. Easley, Judicial Notice on Appeal: A History Lesson in Recent
Trends, 84 FLA. B.J. 45, 45 (2010).
59. FED. R. EVID. 201(e).
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Consider again the Supreme Court's conclusion in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan" that the possibility of substantial civil lia-
bility would lead publishers to behave with caution. Although this
is a causal claim and not a simple fact, it is certainly the kind of
empirical claim that can be and has been the subject of judicial
notice." And although the Supreme Court in Sullivan did not use
the words "judicial notice," taking judicial notice of a causal rela-
tionship not litigated below is essentially what the Court did. But
here, unlike in other areas, what seems obvious may on closer in-
spection possibly not be so. Several prominent media figures
claimed that Sullivan's change in the libel liability rules would
have no effect on their behavior, and this perception is consistent
with the fact that many jurisdictions with substantially less press-
protective libel regimes appear to have a public press every bit as
aggressive as that existing in the United States after Sullivan.6 2
And this seems to be the product of the fact that although pub-
lishers have preferences for cost-saving and liability-avoidance,
they also have preferences for complying with certain professional
norms and consumer preferences, all of which lead them to be will-
ing to absorb the costs that the Court in Sullivan assumed they
would not.
This of course is only one example, but there are many others.
But the lesson of this example is not that appellate courts should
not draw on facts not contained in the record. That would be im-
possible. The lesson is only that the idea of judicial notice may do
far less work in justifying that practice than Judge Posner and
others believe. When the Supreme Court drew on political science
research as reported in the Omaha World-Herald to justify part of
its conclusion in Bush v. Gore," for example, it was not taking no-
tice of a raw fact that was either common knowledge or definitely
established and reported in a standard source. Rather, it was
drawing on facts that, although likely true, would also likely have
been at least partly contested had the matter been litigated at tri-
al.
60. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
61. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083-84 (5th Cir.
1973) (taking judicial notice of a causal relationship between asbestos exposure and various
diseases); Shimp v. N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 368 A.2d 408, 411 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976)
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The disputability of the seemingly indisputable has of course
long been recognized in the judicial notice doctrine and litera-
ture,' which is why taking judicial notice is surrounded by more
procedural safeguards than are necessary in routine exercises of
judicial notice. But the very reason for those procedural safe-
guards suggests the problem with the judicial notice defense of
independent appellate court factual research - often the conclu-
sions of that research are obvious to the judge, but might not be to
others, and might not be in fact. To put it more bluntly, that
which appellate judges think is self-evidently right may be wrong.
And without the procedural safeguards of the adversary trial or
the traditional approach to judicial notice, the risks come without
the most obvious approach to alleviating them.
It is thus telling that in the perceptive and valuable Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
Advisory Committee, in explaining in detail why Rule 201 applied
only to adjudicative facts and not to legislative facts, described the
process of determining legislative facts in terms of "judicial access"
and not "judicial notice."" Moreover, the Committee made clear
that such judicial access to legislative facts should not be saddled
by an indisputability requirement," and it endorsed Professor Da-
vis's observation that judicial reliance on non-indisputable facts
was essential to legal growth."
In discussing this judicial access to legislative facts, the Adviso-
ry Committee also emphasized the procedural safeguards of a par-
ty's "opportunity to hear and be heard"" as well as the safeguards
of "exchanging briefs."" And thus the issue is now clearer. If we
assume, with Judge Posner, that we are talking about legislative
and not adjudicative facts, then judicial notice is not the correct
term, in part because many of the facts with which he is concerned
do not meet the requirement of indisputability that is a prerequi-
64. Cf Jed Rakoff, Are Federal Judges Competent? Dilettantes in an Age of Economic
Expertise, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 4 (2012) (expressing concerns about the conse-
quences of the lack of judicial competence about highly technical questions).
65. FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note, in GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 20, 22
(3d ed. Supp. 2013).
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67. Id. at 20 (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fair-
ness and Convenience, in PERSPECTIVES OF LAW 69 (Roscoe Pound, Erwin N. Griswold, &
Arthur E. Sutherland eds., 1964)); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and
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site for judicial notice, nor is their determination surrounded by
procedural safeguards aimed at ensuring that that which some
judge might think indisputable really is indisputable. But if we
are not talking about judicial notice in the strict sense, and are
thus acknowledging that judges may and should use even poten-
tially disputable facts in the processes of making law and under-
standing the issues before them, then the existence (or not) of ad-
versarial procedures of some form becomes especially important.
VII. CONCLUSION: FACT-FINDING ON APPEAL AND ITS PROCEDURAL
COMPLICATIONS
It turns out, therefore, that Judge Posner's two chief justifica-
tions for independent appellate factual research may not do as
much work for his conclusions as he supposes. Judicial notice,
itself typically surrounded by procedural safeguards, has tradi-
tionally been reserved for a much narrower category of indisputa-
ble facts than the potentially more disputed ones that Judge Pos-
ner has in mind. And judicial research into and use of legislative
facts may not only be different from the somewhat more case-
focused facts that Judge Posner discusses, but itself may ordinari-
ly involve many of the procedural safeguards that we associate
with the appellate process in general.
What makes the issue distinct, therefore, is precisely the ab-
sence of procedural safeguards at the post-briefing and post-
argument stage, the stage at which judges make their decisions
and write their opinions. If judges are doing additional research at
this point, if the wonders of modern technology make such re-
search both easy and common, and if such research is used with-
out an opportunity for serious input by the parties, then an even
deeper question arises: what purpose would be served by notice
and hearing with respect to such facts? One possibility is that the
purpose would be entirely cosmetic, providing a degree of legiti-
mation even if not much in the way of epistemic advantage. And
another, the possibility that undergirds much of the adversary
process generally, is that the judge who can hear all sides on rele-
vant factual issues is likely to have access to more information
and make better decisions than the judge whose only resources
are his or her own and whose only check is the ability of self-
criticism and self-challenge.
These questions of course go not only to independent appellate
research, but also to the adversary system generally. What the
new world of independent appellate factual research, a new world
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quantitatively even if not otherwise, has required us to consider is
just how much benefit is gained from adversarial procedures gen-
erally, what kind of benefit it is, whether it is as applicable in this
context as to all of the other aspects of the legal process, and
whether, in this context, the benefits are worth the costs." Con-
sideration of these issues must be left for other occasions, but
Judge Posner's candor, as well as his insight, has helped us to
start on what is likely to be an increasing important task of insti-
tutional design.
70. On the possibility of remand, see Bryant, supra note 5, at 478-80.
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